COP14 Day By Day Developments

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The major developments which occurred during the COP14 climate change meeting in Poznan were:

December 1

  • In ECO, Climate Action Network International flagged that seven specific outcomes at Poznan would be required to ensure that an effective agreement could be concluded at the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen. There were:
  • Annex 1 countries should "reaffirm their commitment to deep emission reductions by 2020." and "must be aiming for an aggregate target that has the highest level of ambition within the indicative range (25-40% below 1990) to provide some prospect of staying below 2 degrees of average warming."
  • Annex 1 countries "need to show support for strong financial mechanisms that can deliver the substantial sums of money to developing countries for adaptation, technology " and the REDD scheme. While praising a proposal from Norway as "promising" they cautioned that "approaches outside the UNFCCC, such as through the World Bank, are not the way forward."
  • a decision should be made to make the Adaptation Fund Board will "become operational in 2009" together with an "ambitious 3-year adaptation work program that focuses on implementation and capacity."
  • progress needed to be made on technology transfer. CAN signaled that "a new mechanism under the UNFCCC is needed for both R&D and diffusion of clean low-carbon technologies" and that a proposal from the G-77/China was a "very useful starting point for the negotiations."
  • "A strong decision was required on REDD" which they stated "must support the equitable sharing of benefits among and within countries, including through the explicit recognition of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity. Without consideration of these issues the long-term effectiveness of REDD would be critically undermined." They cautioned that "failure to achieve a decision on REDD in Poznan will risk a weak decision, or none at all, in the pressure of last minute deals at Copenhagen."
  • The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) "should not remain an offsetting mechanism that allows industrialized countries to trade-off their dual obligations to reduce their own emissions and to support mitigation in developing countries. Also, the CDM must not continue to rely on the ability to test the additionality of each individual project, which is simply not feasible to do accurately."
  • "Significant progress", they wrote, was needed on the Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry "rules that need to be understood when targets are discussed. The revised LULUCF framework must deliver mandatory emission reductions from forest management and peatland degradation."[3]

December 2

  • the Alliance of Small Island States argued for stabilization at well below 350 parts per million and limiting temperature increase to below 1.5 degrees centigrade. It argued that a global reduction of over 85% was required by 2050 from 1990 levels and that developed countries should cut emissions by over 40% by 2020 and 95% by 2050. It also argued that greenhouse gas concentrations should peak in 2015, tat the targets adopted must be based on the most recent scientific information and that critical thresholds for less developed countries and small island countries should not be crossed. It also argued that the funding of adaptation should be by way of grants not loans so that it was consistent with the polluter pays principle.[5]
  • Japan proposed a non-binding goal of at least a 50% reduction by 2050 and promoted its sectoral approaches proposal;[4]
  • Brazil proposed a 25-40% reduction by Annex I countries, substantial cuts by developing countries and sharing the burden based on historical responsibility and equity;[4]
  • The EU stated that the aim should be to limit average temperature increase to less than 2 degree Centigrade which would require a 50% reduction by 2050 compared to the 1990 base year. It also argued that developing countries should cut emissions by 25-30% by 2020 compared to the business--as-usual scenario. South Africa criticized the EU's proposed 30% cut by 2020 as being too little and challenged it to set out the scientific case for developing countries adopting a 15-30% target.
  • The Third World Network noted that the Maldives also supported the 350 parts per million target of keeping temperature increases to below 1.5 degrees.[6]
  • China pointed out that developed countries emissions continue to grow after their industrialization and that they have contributed 75% of the accumulated greenhouse gas emissions despite having only 20% of the world's population. TWN stated that China's argued that "the carbon space has been excessively occupied by developed countries. Thus they should greatly cut their emission to allow space for developing countries. Large scale technology transfer is a precondition for developing countries to make greater contributions to addressing climate change." China also emphasized that emissions reduction targets - referred to in the negotiations under the banner of 'mitigation', was only one element of the key themes needed in a 'shared vision' with the others being adaptation, finance, technology and sustainable development.[5]
  • In ECO, Climate Action Network International CAN called on "Annex I countries to demonstrate their leadership by aiming high, and pushing targets to the top of the IPCC range of 40% cuts from 1990 levels by 2020. The majority of these cuts must happen domestically in Annex I countries to accelerate their transition to a low carbon economy and create incentives for and investment in clean technologies. A high level of ambition on mitigation by Annex I countries, along with a clear offer on finance and technology, might facilitate a substantial deviation below business-as-usual by developing countries."[7]

December 3

  • A contact group on the Clean Development Mechanism was established. This followed a range of concerns being raised about its operation, ENB reported[8]
  • China, Japan and other complained about delays in projects being registered. China also called for more transparency and simplifying accreditation of Designated Operational Entities;
  • African countries urged a broader distribution of projects;
  • business groups wanted a review of the CDM and institutional changed while environmental groups raised concerns about assessing "additionality" in proposed projects and adverse environmental and social impacts of some projects.
  • in that days edition of ECO, Climate Action Network International CAN argued that "Extensive analysis clearly shows that a substantial proportion of CDM projects are non-additional. This non-additionality, combined with the reliance of many industrialized countries on the CDM to meet their Kyoto targets, causes the CDM to significantly undermine efforts to cut global GHG emissions. ECO is convinced that reliably proving additionality of individual projects is simply impossible since it requires knowledge about a hypothetical future. Furthermore, it is illusory to believe that private sector validators are able to bear the main responsibility for ensuring the environmental integrity of the mechanism."[9]
They also argued that "the only solution to these problems is to completely replace or substantially restructure the CDM in the post-2012 regime. In our view, such a replacement or reform should follow these basic principles: First, the CDM should not be a mechanism that allows Annex I countries to offset their emission reduction obligations. Instead, industrialized countries must provide financial and technological support to developing countries in a way that is independent from and additional to their domestic emission reduction targets. Secondly, a restructured CDM also must cease to rely on the ability to test the additionality of each individual project, which is simply not feasible to do accurately. In the interim, it will be important to avoid the negative aspects of the CDM, such as lack of a requirement for projects to meet internationally accepted sustainable development criteria; the distorted geographical spread of project activities; the conflict of interest of project validators and EB members; and perverse incentives associated with HFC-23 and N2O destruction projects."[9] (See also Clean Development Mechanism and HFC-23 destruction).
  • A workshop on a "shared visions" carried over from the previous day.
  • The US - in a break from the positions advocated by representatives of the Bush Administration - stated that global emissions reductions should be 50% by 2050 from 1990 levels and emphasized that all countries had a role to play based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.[10]
  • in response to a question, the EU stated that the target per capita emissions by 2050 should be 2 tonnes;[10]
  • Gabon stated that all countries needed to reduce their emissions: "The question is if we are all worthy of our planet which is now burning?"[10]
  • Papua New Guinea stated that there was a need to be on the aggressive side of the emission reduction ranges and that developing countries can cut emissions from the business as usual scenario if supported by finance and technology.[10]
  • Discussions on the review of the financial mechanisms of the convention, TWN reported, "resumed with a clear division between developed countries supporting the work of the GEF as adequate, and developing countries expressing profound concerns over the performance of the financial mechanisms and the GEF as an operating entity."[11]
  • In a statement the South African Environmental Affairs Minister Marthinus Van Schalkwyk said that "Japan, Russia, Australia and Canada have avoided putting their numbers on the table for too long. They now need to come forward with credible and ambitious mid-term targets within the 25 per cent to 40 per cent range." [12]

December 4

  • ENB reported that in discussion on the possible inclusion of Carbon Capture and Storage in the Clean Development Mechanism "delegates considered draft text setting out various options, including an EU proposal for a pilot phase. Some parties supported CCS under the CDM, while others said it should not be included in the current commitment period, but might be considered at a later stage."[13]
  • On REDD ENB noted that "in a contact group and informal consultations, delegates considered draft text setting out various options, including an EU proposal for a pilot phase. Some parties supported CCS under the CDM, while others said it should not be included in the current commitment period, but might be considered at a later stage.'[13]
  • CAN criticized the European Union for its failure to table detailed proposals on technology transfer and related issues. In ECO CAN stated that the EU should support:
  • "an overall Technology Development Objective with a goal of achieving true global cooperation on technology and a focus on increasing overall levels of innovation and access, not just narrow technology transfer;"
  • "a strategic focus on technology and innovation which could be guided by a series of Technology Action Programmes for critical technologies, including for both mitigation and adaptation;"
  • "a clear statement showing that the EU is taking the G77/China calls for a new Multilateral Climate Technology Fund (MCTF) seriously and that this will be an important basis for future discussions;"
  • "an emphasis on the need to provide financial and technical support to developing countries in order to build their own innovative and absorptive capacity to successfully use and adapt new technologies, not a narrow focus on enabling environments;"
  • "recognition that where intellectual property rights issues are a barrier to technology access there should be a clear framework for action to balance the need to give incentives to innovators, with the imperative to share technology fairly in order to solve the climate problem".[14]

December 5

  • Earth Negotiations Bulletin noted that discussion whether Carbon Capture and Storage would be included in the Clean Development Mechanism continued. "During informal consultations, delegates discussed the various options set out in the Co-Chairs’ draft text. However, differences remained over including CCS under the CDM. Informal consultations will continue," it reported.[15]
  • Further contact group discussion was held on the proposed Adaptation Fund."On a possible conflict of interest with regard to multiple roles of the World Bank, its representative clarified that purchases and sales of CERs [Certified Emissions Reductions] take place in two markets (primary and secondary) that do not overlap. He added that the Bank will take additional measures to minimize any apparent conflicts of interest. Delegates also discussed direct access to funds, particularly the issue of the legal status of the Fund. TUVALU presented his proposal to give the Adaptation Fund Board the legal capacity to enter into certain legal agreements. BANGLADESH said funding criteria should be developed, such as a “vulnerability index.” Informal consultations will continue on Saturday."[15]
  • On the CDM, ECO noted that "Current discussions about tightening the additionality testing procedures mask the underlying problem that project development decisions are subjective, and that additionality testing is inherently inaccurate. Developers cannot 'prove' their own intentions, and external auditors (validators) cannot judge other’s motivations ... It is necessary that industrialized countries effectively support decarbonization in developing countries, and in the least developed countries, in the context of the millennium development goals. This requires replacing the current subjective additionality testing approach with more accurate means of filtering projects worthy of support, and filtering out business-as-usual activities."[16]

December 6

  • A LWG-LCA Workshop on Research and Development of Technology heard presentations including from:
  • Discussion continued on "issues related to direct access to and legal status of the Adaptation Fund, while a small group of legal experts also met to address the issue of the legal status ... Several developed countries agreed to accept all the draft documents" and a group of developing countries sought clarification on specific legal issues.[17]
  • ECO expressed frustration at the lack of developed countries willingness to articulate their role in an effective "shared vision". "Building on Kyoto, rich countries will need to take on legally binding commitments that are multi-layered. Firstly, developed countries should take on deeper economy-wide quantified emissions limitation and reduction objectives at the top end of the 25 to 40% below 1990 by 2020, and 80 to 95% by 2050 ranges. A large majority of these emissions reductions must be achieved domestically. Further, sectoral measures are required to reduce emissions from international aviation and shipping. Developed countries should also commit to specific financial and technological support for enhanced mitigation and adaptation actions by developing countries, enabling them to substantially deviate their emissions below the business-as-usual baseline. Clear rules need to be established to avoid double or triple counting between the various types of commitments. Enhanced actions by Non-Annex I countries must be enabled and supported by financing, non-financial measures and flexible mechanisms from Annex I countries – measurable, reportable and verifiable financing must be additional to the use of flexible mechanisms by Annex I countries intended to achieve their own targets. The combined package of multi-layered commitments and enhanced actions need to deliver on the ultimate objective of the Convention and keep warming well below 2˚C."[18]
  • They also noted ahead of the finance ministers meeting that "Finance ministers need to answer three interrelated questions: How will they mobilize the massively scaled up public funding needed to respond to the climate challenge; how will these funds be managed at an international level, and how can these funds be channeled and used most effectively to generate and leverage a technology revolution and low-carbon development worldwide."[18]

December 7

December 8

December 9

  • Discussions continued on the Adaptation Fund with slow progress being made.[20]
  • ENB noted that discussions on the Clean Development Mechanism continued late into the night. Specific issues included "transparency of the CDM Executive Board’s decision making, accreditation of DOEs [Decision Making Entities] and application of financial penalties to non-complying DOEs. The draft decision also considers the CDM’s regional and sub-regional distribution, and includes text on: simplifying and streamlining the process and requirements; facilitating development of methodologies; and supporting identification and development of project design documents in certain countries and regions," ENB reported.[20]
  • The stalemate over whether to include Carbon Capture and Storage in the Clean Development Mechanism continued. ENB reported that "informal consultations on this issue ended without agreement on draft decision text, which remained bracketed. Delegates then considered whether to forward the bracketed text to the COP/MOP or to SBSTA 31. However, they were unable to agree on where to forward the text."[20]
  • ENB reported that in relation to negotiations over REDD that "delegates made progress on text regarding indigenous peoples, monitoring, and readiness, with provisional agreement reported on Tuesday evening."[20]
  • ECO expressed concern about lobbying for the retention and expansion of loopholes under Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry. "The desire to maintain the ongoing loopholes and the creation of more, does not bode well for negotiations on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. The key issues on methodologies are addressing how to account for and reduce the conversion of primary natural and peatland forest ecosystems to plantation monocultures and through industrial logging. If loopholes are created here, the atmosphere will see more emissions, indigenous peoples rights wont be respected and the effectiveness of any positive incentives in developing countries will be severely restricted. Finally, if developing countries have to address forest degradation, the same should apply to developed countries."[21]
  • ECO also outlined proposals by some NGO's on reforms of the CDM. These included the:
  • "it is imperative to remove the current conflict of interest where the validators are selected and paid by the project participants. In the future, this should be done by the UNFCCC secretariat or another appropriate UNFCCC body."
  • "the current arbitrary assessment of the additionality of CDM projects ... should be replaced by a set of more objective rules, such as clear definitions of “common practice” and of what constitutes a “barrier.”
  • "the CMP should decide that all CDM projects must meet the social and environmental standards laid out in the CDM Gold Standard" and that "the assessment of the sustainable development contribution of a project should be undertaken by an independent institution such as, for example, the validators (if selected and paid by UNFCCC)".
  • "The role of the CDM Executive Board should be changed so that a permanent professional body reporting to the EB is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the CDM. The current structure, where a parttime EB meets every one or two months for a couple of days to discuss dozens of requests for project reviews and numerous proposals for methodologies is inadequate."
  • "the CMP should adopt a code of conduct for CDM Executive Board members that clarifies what constitutes a conflict of interest and ensures that Board members do not participate in discussion and decisions where they may have a conflict of interest."
  • "the CMP should require that CDM Executive Board members do not work for a Designated National Authority (DNA), a validator or for an institution engaged in the CDM market."[22]

Wednesday December 10

The meetings on Wednesday were the final wrap-up sessions for:

ENB reported on the final considerations of the groups with some of the key developments being:

  • SBSTA:

December 11

  • Earth Negotiations Bulletin noted that 50 ministers and head opf delegations spoke in the High-Level Segment of the COP and MOP. Perhaps the most notable was the statement by Grenada for AOSIS which "expressed disappointment at lack of progress on issues such as the Adaptation Fund. Maldives, for the LDCs, said a 2°C temperature rise would take the world into the “danger zone.” Both AOSIS and LDCs urged a limit of 1.5°C temperature rise and greenhouse gas concentrations of no more than 350 ppm, as well as 40% emission reductions by developed countries by 2020 compared with 1990 levels."[24]
  • ECO:
  • bemoaned "the current surreal state of the REDD negotiations, including the (non)conclusions coming out of SBSTA, is not setting up the creation of a mechanism likely to achieve any of the outcomes Parties have so sincerely expressed hopes for ... A REDD mechanism without strong requirements for good governance, transparency and complementary demand-side driver policies, without respect for the rights and interests of forest-dependent peoples, or without a reality-based definition of what a forest and its degradation really are = a failure."[25]
  • concluded that the Poznan talks had made little progress and noted that few developed countries had made any significant new commitments. "On the level of ambition for overall developed country mitigation targets there has been no progress beyond the language agreed a year ago at Bali. And very few developed countries have made any concrete offers of finance, technology and capacity building support for mitigation actions by developing countries. This leaves progress on the adaptation fund as perhaps the one tangible outcome of the talks at Poznan – and this is still not decided."[26]

Summary of COP

Major Developments and Failures

In its 17-page summary of the two weeks of discussion, Earth Negotiations Bulletin noted that COP14 had attracted over 9250 participants including "almost 4000 government officials, 4500 representatives of UN bodies and agencies, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations, and more than 800 accredited members of the media." However, while the scale of the event was huge there was limited progress.

For example ENB noted that in discussions on REDD "Extended consultations focused on the presence of a semicolon in text recommending methodological guidance on “issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.” This text, present in early drafts, was drawn from paragraph 1(b)(iii) of the Bali Action Plan. India and others, seeking a more central role for conservation and other activities, sought removal of the semicolon, which would give these issues more prominence in the text. The final text included a comma in place of the semicolon, a move many interpreted as a small victory for inclusion of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in any possible future REDD mechanism."[27]

The most substantial decision of the conference of parties related to the Adaptation Fund. ENB noted that[27] during COP14 it had been agreed that the fund should commence operations as soon as possible but that there was no agreement "on enabling direct access of parties to the Fund, which is one of the three tracks under the decision 1/CMP.3. The two other tracks are access through implementing entities and through accredited executing entities at the national level." At the Ministerial level meeting it was agreed that direct access would be approved, though with the qualification that "these provisions will be reviewed as part of the review envisaged in decision 1/CMP.3, paragraph 33, taking into account the feasibility study commissioned by the Adaptation Fund Board.".[28]

However, the Third World Network reported that the most significant failure of COP14 was the fact that "negotiations broke down over new funding sources for climate-related adaptation activities in developing countries ... Many developed-country parties would not agree with the developing countries' demands that the Adaptation Fund also obtain revenues through the JI {Joint Implementation] and ET [Emissions Trading]."[29]

Amongst issues discussed, the ENB reported that:[27]

  • no decision was made on whether or not to overturn the current exemption of emissions from the maritime and aviation industries;
  • supporters of the inclusion of Carbon Capture and Storage projects in the Clean Development Mechanism gained agreement for the matter to be referred to the Executive Board of CDM who would "report back to COP/MOP 5." ENB also noted that in the final plenary meeting "Venezuela proposed that the Board set up a working group to study the technical and legal aspects of CCS, and delegates agreed to reflect Venezuela’s statement in the meeting’s record"; and
  • proposals by some developed countries for differentiation amongst developing countries was firmly rejected.


In its analysis of the conference, ENB noted that "pressure is mounting for the remaining 12 months: serious negotiations must begin as soon as possible in 2009 to secure an agreement in Copenhagen next December." It noted that where the Bali Action Plan had been agreed to in the wake of the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) the Pozan talks were overshadowed by the worsening global financial crisis, the weakening of the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme and the hiatus between the election of Barack Obama as US President and his inauguration. ENB concluded that "in Poznań, the US was still represented by the Bush administration and remained relatively subdued during the official negotiations. Some felt that uncertainty about the US position in 2009 caused other countries to refrain from making significant political advances in Poznań, and few expect developing countries to make significant moves before developed countries have clarified their positions on emission reductions and financing."[27]

On the central issues in the discussions, ENB suggested that:[27]

  • a target emissions reductions target - which some had hoped COP14 would determine as a way of framing more detailed negotiations -- will not be decided until COP15;
  • the "assembly document from AWG-LCA was expected to evolve into draft negotiating text in the "first half of 2009";
  • the "success on the Adaptation Fund was tempered by the inability to secure additional resources for the Fund due to lack of agreement on extending the share of proceeds (or “adaptation levy”) to Joint Implementation and emissions trading under the second review of the Protocol under Article 9.";

They also noted that for "both the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA, one of the first key tasks is generating formal negotiating texts that must be communicated to the parties at least six months before Copenhagen to comply with legal formalities. The Poznań Conference was widely seen as a successful step in that direction as the Chairs of both AWGs were mandated to prepare documents for the March/April meeting in Bonn."[27] "The task of the AWG-LCA for 2009 will not be easy. The group will have to finalize an agreement on all four building blocks and a shared vision. It is the only body where all countries, including the US and developing countries, participate in discussions on mitigation. Thus, negotiations on a global long-term goal, comparability of mitigation efforts by developed countries and MRV in the context of nationally appropriate developing country mitigation actions are expected to be central. Importantly, MRV also applies to developed country support to developing countries through technology, finance and capacity-building, so ways of doing this will have to be identified. With regard to financing and technology, the AWG-LCA faces the challenge of reaching agreement on the architecture to both finance mitigation and adaptation actions, and facilitate technology development and transfer," ENB wrote.

ENB also noted that "some participants left Poznań somewhat worried, feeling that while scientific evidence on climate change is strengthening, the 'spirit of Bali' is weakening along with countries’ determination to fight climate change in light of the serious economic crisis."[27]

Bulletins from the Conference

  • Climate Action Network International's Eco's
    • Poznan ECO 1, ECO, Climate Action Network International, December 1, 2008.
    • Poznan ECO 2, ECO, Climate Action Network International, December 2, 2008.
    • ECO 3, ECO, Climate Action Network International, December 3, 2008.
    • Poznan ECO 4, ECO, Climate Action Network International, December 4, 2008.
    • Poznan ECO 5, ECO, Climate Action Network International, December 5, 2008.
    • Poznan ECO 6, ECO, Climate Action Network International, December 6, 2008.
    • Poznan ECO 7, ECO, Climate Action Network International, December 9, 2008.
    • ECO No 8 not loaded to the website
    • Poznan ECO 9, ECO, Climate Action Network International, December 11, 2008.

Overall Summaries of COP14

Articles and Resources

Related SourceWatch Articles


  1. "Previous coverage from COP 14", UNFCCC, December 1, 2008, (Scroll down). (A podcast of the media conference is available here).
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2 COP 14 and COP/MOP 4 Highlights: December 1, 2008", Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Volume 12 Number 386 - Tuesday, December 2, 2008.
  3. Climate Action Network, "The Copenhagen Countdown", ECO, December 1, 2008, pages 1 & 4.
  4. 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 "COP14 Highlights December 2, 2008", Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Volume 12 Number 387, December 3, 2008.
  5. 5.0 5.1 Martin Khor, "Parties debate "shared vision" in UNFCCC workshop", Third World Network, December 3, 2008.
  6. Meena Raman, "Shared vision" debate dominates Poznan's opening plenary", Third World Network, December 2, 2008.
  7. ECO 3, Climate Action Network International, December 3, 2008.
  8. "COP14 Highlights December 3, 2008", Volume 12 Number 388, December 4, 2008.
  9. 9.0 9.1 ECO 3, Climate Action Network International, December 3, 2008.
  10. 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 Meena Raman, "Further discussions on "shared vision" in AWG LCA workshop", Third World Network, December 4, 2008.
  11. Lim Li Lin & Juan Hoffmaister, "Continuing differences in technology and financial mechanism discussions", December 4, 2008.
  12. Adam Morton, "Australia blasted on target delay", The Age, December 4, 2008.
  13. 13.0 13.1 "COP14 Highlights December 4, 2008", Volume 12 Number 389, December 5, 2008.
  14. Poznan "Time for the EU to Step Up", ECO, Climate Action Network International, December 4, 2008.
  15. 15.0 15.1 "COP14 Highlights December 5, 2008", Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Volume 12 Number 390, December 6, 2008.
  16. "It's Additional - Because I Said So", ECO, Climate Action Network International, December 5, 2008.
  17. 17.0 17.1 17.2 "COP14 Highlights December 6, 2008", Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Volume 12 Number 391, December 7, 2008.
  18. 18.0 18.1 "20/20 Vision on 2020", ECO, Climate Action Network International, December 6, 2008.
  19. Meena Raman, "Mitigation group discusses how to measure, report and verify efforts", December 9, 2008.
  20. 20.0 20.1 20.2 20.3 "COP14 Highlights December 9, 2008", Volume 12 Number 392, December 10, 2008.
  21. "Missing: Billions of Tonnes of CO2", Poznan ECO 7, Climate Action Network International, December 9, 2008.
  22. "Spring Cleaning the CDM", ECO 7, Climate Action Network International, December 9, 2008.
  23. 23.0 23.1 23.2 "COP14 Highlights December 10, 2008", Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Volume 12 Number 393, December 11, 2008.
  24. "COP14 Highlights December 11, 2008", Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Volume 12 Number 394, December 12, 2008.
  25. "Setting REDD up for failure?", ECO, Climate Action Network International, December 11, 2008.
  26. "Welcome Ministers! Time to get this show on the road", ECO, Climate Action Network International, December 11, 2008.
  27. 27.0 27.1 27.2 27.3 27.4 27.5 27.6 "COP14 Highlights December 1-12, 2008: Summary of the Fourteenth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Fourth Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol", Volume 12 Number 395, December 15, 2008.
  28. Conference of the Parties, "Agenda item 8: Report of the Adaptation Fund Board", UNFCCC, December 12, 2008.
  29. Lim Li Lin, "Poznan meetings end after intense "mini-Ministerial" talks", December 14, 2008.

External Articles